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I. INTRODUCTION
Lindsay Cooper is a twenty-six-year-old graduate student studying
to become a physician's assistant.' By the fall of her second year,
Lindsay had accumulated $150,000 in debt due to loans for her edu-
cation, living expenses, two credit cards, and a recent loan needed to
make her car lease payments. After weeks of passing an advertise-
ment seeking "dreammakers" conveniently posted on a bulletin
board down the hall from her anatomy classroom, Lindsay made a
few telephone inquires and decided to become an egg donor. Eight
weeks, ten doctor's visits, and twenty-eight hormone injections later,
Lindsay underwent a minor surgical procedure whereby a cycle of her
eggs" were extracted from her body and she received $8000 for her
"time and labor."'5 Fortunately, Lindsay experienced only minor side
effects during her treatment and was able to schedule her doctor's
visits around her classes." In fact, the process went so well that she re-
turned to the clinic ten months later to donate another cycle of eggs.
7
Lindsay enjoyed being able to help an infertile couple have
children, but admits that donating her eggs was a service she pro-
. J.D., 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Gettysburg College.
I would like to thank my family for their constant love and support throughout law
school. Additionally, thank you to Cristina Finetti and Professor Carl Coleman for
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Interview with Lindsay Cooper, Student, Mercy College, Graduate Program in
Physician Assistant Studies (July 15, 2007). The name of the interviewee has been
changed for privacy purposes.
2 Id.
3 Id. "Donor" is defined as "an individual from whom blood, tissue, or an organ
is taken for transplantation." STEDMAN'S MEDiciL DICTIONARY 536 (27th ed. 2000).
4 "Egg" refers to "the female [reproductive] cell, or gamete." STEDMAN'S
MEDIcAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 570.
5 Interview with Lindsay Cooper, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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vided in order to pay off some of her debt.' Like any young adult,
Lindsay hopes to have a successful and meaningful career and one
day plans to marry and have children of her own.9 She admits that
she has never really thought about how she would feel if twenty years
from now she were contacted by her donor offspring.'° "Before I be-
gan the process, I signed an agreement that I was to be an anonym-
ous donor," Lindsay explained." She also acknowledged that she
would not have donated eggs through a program that did not allow
her to donate anonymously.' 2 Lindsay was unaware that in some
countries donor offspring are allowed to access information about
their donor's identity upon reaching the age of majority.13 In reflect-
ing on the subject, Lindsay commented that she understands the de-
sire to know where one comes from, but believes it is problematic:'4
In donating my eggs I gave up the right to know if there is a child
out there that has my genetic makeup-and that is something I
will never get back.... I can imagine it might be easier to make
the case for a child, but we are talking about the same right .... If
I cannot have children one day and want to find out if there is a
child out there that is genetically linked to me, I cannot .... I do
not see how a child can be given the right to find out my identity
if I am denied the right to find out theirs. ' 5
This Comment focuses on a specific legal issue which has yet to
be addressed by state or federal legislators: whether donor offspring
should have the right to access information regarding the identity of
their egg or sperm donor upon reaching the age of majority. This
delicate issue will likely surface in the near future because many do-
nor offspring are now approaching majority age.' 6 Increased adop-
tion law litigation and recent enactment of state laws allowing for the
opening of sealed records provides a preview of what legal issues may
Id. See Steven R. Lindheim, Michael Frumovitz & Mark V. Sauer, Recruitment
and Screening Policies and Procedures Used to Establish a Paid Donor Oocyte Registry, 13
HUM. REPROD. 2020 (1998). In a survey of egg donor patients who participated in
gamete donation programs at the Center for Women's Reproductive Care at Colum-
bia University, ninety percent of donors reported financial compensation was their
number one reason for participation. Id.






15 Interview with Lindsay Cooper, supra note 1.
16 See infra Part II (establishing that children created through egg donation are
currently twenty-five years old or younger, whereas children created through sperm
donation may be much older).
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arise in the area of gamete donation. Legal commentators in support
of open adoption records'7 have asserted that arguments in favor of
disclosure can be made for both donor offspring and adopted child-
ren as both desire to learn about their biological parents. Is Moreo-
ver, the passage of laws either permitting or requiring such disclosure
in the near future will likely lead to a large volume of litigation.
Part II of this Comment introduces the reader to the in vitro fer-
tilization (IVF) medical procedure and provides descriptions of the
egg donation and sperm donation processes. Part III sets forth the
current state of the law with regard to assisted reproductive technolo-
gy and gamete donation. Part III also examines various state laws on
disclosure of identifying information in the adoption law context, as
well as common arguments made in favor of opening sealed records
as sources of guidance for legislators faced with the possible future
task of crafting laws regarding disclosure of donor identity in the ga-
mete donation context. In addition, Part III considers approaches
taken by other countries concerning regulation of assisted reproduc-
tive technologies, focusing particularly on those countries that have
enacted laws allowing or disallowing the disclosure of donor identity.
Part IV suggests that laws permitting or requiring disclosure of
donor identity should not be enacted, focusing primarily on the
competing interests of the parties involved in an IVF procedure using
donor eggs and/or sperm, such as: the donor's privacy interest and
reasonable expectation to maintain an anonymous status, the child's
interest in finding out information about him or herself, and the in-
tended parents' interest in making familial decisions about how to
raise their children without unwarranted state interference. In addi-
tion, Part V sets forth practical and legal consequences which might
result if such laws are enacted and examines the flaws inherent in ar-
guments favoring enactment of laws permitting or requiring disclo-
sure of donor identity. Part IV ultimately contends that the issue of
disclosure of donor identity should be analyzed as a public policy
matter, rather than as a constitutional issue, as courts have not yet
ruled as to whether the interests at issue are "fundamental" rights. 19
Therefore, Part IV introduces factors legislators should consider
17 "Open adoption records" refers to a position some states and countries have
taken whereby they do not maintain closed (or sealed) records in order to keep
adoption information confidential. See Nancy S. Ashe, The Open Records Debate
(2008), http://www.adopting.org/adoptions/the-open-records-debate-2.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009). Rather, such states or countries allow adult adoptees to access
identifying information about their birthparents (the laws vary). Id.
See infra Part III.A.
19 See infra Part IV.
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when weighing the competing interests, ultimately demonstrating
that legislation permitting or requiring disclosure of donor identity
would be an inappropriate exercise of state police power.
Finally, Part V offers an alternative approach to regulating the
sensitive issue of disclosure of donor identity without enacting a law
permitting or requiring such disclosure, acknowledging the need to
devise a solution that is best for all parties and one that is not solely
beneficial to adults at the expense of children. It contends that it
would be more appropriate to address this issue on a case-by-case ba-
sis given the unique competing interests at stake rather than through
sweeping legislation. Ultimately, this Comment contends that while a
child created through gamete donation has a right, as a matter of
policy, to access general information about his or her heritage and
medical history, this right should not include access to the donor's
identity. Allowing for such access would violate the donor's privacy
interest and reasonable expectation of anonymity, and would also
generate problems for all the parties involved, our society in general,
and the future of medical science.
II. BACKGROUND
Infertility is generally defined as "a disease of the reproductive system
that impairs one of the body's most basic functions: the conception of
children," through unprotected sexual intercourse after a certain pe-
riod of time.2 ° Several possible causes of infertility problems are at-
tributable to factors affecting both males and females.21 In fact, one
out of every seven couples trying to conceive children experience dif-
ficulty.2 2 In 2002, seven percent of married couples (2.1 million) re-
20 Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility,
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html#Q1 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter
FAQ About Infertility]; see N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 10
(1998) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS].
21 Among couples being tested for infertility problems, forty percent of problems
are generally found to be associated with male factors, forty percent with female fac-
tors, ten percent with both male and female, and ten percent of such problems re-
main unexplained. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITYAND ITS TREATMENT 8 (1998) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY]. According to medical research, there is less known
about male infertility than female infertility and the specific cause of male infertility
is identified in only about twenty percent of cases. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 29 (citing R.S. Swerdloff et al., Infertility in the
Male, 103 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 906 (1985)).
2 AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., INFERTIuTY: AN OVERVIEW, A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 3
(2003), available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/infertilityover
view.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
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ported that they had not used contraception in twelve months and
the woman had not become pregnant. 23 In addition, approximately
1.2 million out of 62 million women (two percent) of reproductive
24
age had an infertility-related medical appointment within the year.
Fortunately, medical advancements in the field of reproductive tech-
nology have enabled infertile couples and individuals to explore sev-
eral treatment options in pursuit of their dream to conceive children
that are in some way biologically connected to them. "'
IVF,26 the most common type of assisted reproductive technology
(ART),7 involves removing oocytes2 8 from a woman's ovaries for ferti-
lization outside her body.2 The surgically removed eggs are then
mixed with spermatozoa3 0 (sperm) in a Petri dish in the laboratory.
31
In the event fertilization leads to embryo 2 formation, the resulting
embryos are transferred into the woman's uterus through the cer-
vix. 33 If the transfer is successful, the embryo will implant itself into
the uterine wall as if natural conception had occurred.34 This proce-
dure can be performed with eggs and sperm from the patient
couple-the intended parents--or with donor eggs and/or donor
23 See Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (providing statistics on
infertility).
24 Id.
25 Victoria Clay Wright et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance: United
States, 2004 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
ss5606al.htm?scid=ss5606al-e (establishing that in 2004, more than 49,000 infants
were born in the United States from a type of assisted reproductive technology).
26 See FAQ About Infertility, supra note 20 (explaining "in vitro" is Latin for "in
glass").
27 ART refers to "[a]ll treatments or procedures that involve surgically removing
eggs from a woman's ovaries and combining the eggs with sperm to help a woman
become pregnant." QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 71.
28 An "oocyte" is an "immature ovum, an egg cell." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1263.
29 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 72.
'Spermatozoa" is defined as "the male gamete or sex cell that contains the ge-
netic information to be transmitted by the male, exhibits autokinesia [automatic
movement], and is able to effect zygosis [the union of gametes to form a zygote] with
an ovum." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1666.
31 See FAQ About Infertility, supra note 20.
32 "Embryo" is defined as "[i]n humans, the developing organism from concep-
tion until approximately the end of the second month; developmental stages from
this time to birth are commonly designated as fetal." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 581.
33 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 71.
M AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE
FOR PATIENTS 8 (2003) [hereinafter ART: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS].
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sperm.35 When donor eggs are used, the resulting embryo is trans-
ferred either into the intended mother of the child-if she can carry
the pregnancy-or into a surrogate carrier.36 This Comment focuses
exclusively on IVF procedures involving donor gametes37 whereby the
gestational carrier is the intended mother. Thus, the donor offspring
referred to in this Comment will have been carried in the womb of
the intended mother although the child may or may not be genetical-
ly related to her. 8
It is estimated that in the United States about 40,000 children
are born each year through the use of donor eggs and/or donor
35 In Orford v. Orford, a Canadian court held that a physician and a woman com-
mitted adultery when the physician employed the method of artificial insemination
to impregnate the woman. 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921). The court found "the essence
of the offence of adultery consists, not in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual in-
tercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive pow-
ers or faculties of the guilty person; and any submission of those powers to the service
or enjoyment of any person other than the husband or the wife comes within the de-
finition of 'adultery."' Id. The United States courts adopted this view in Doornbos v.
Doornbos, finding that because the woman had not been inseminated by her husband,
the child was "illegitimate" and the husband was therefore not the legal parent. 139
N.E.2d 844, 844 (Ill. Ct. App. 1956). This reasoning was highly criticized and later
abandoned. See People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968) (holding that artificial
insemination does not constitute adultery). The Uniform Parentage Act was later
enacted to eliminate the legal distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
children in the ART context. See UNIF PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 295 (2000).
36 A "surrogate" carrier is a woman who carries the embryo for the term of the
pregnancy and gives birth to the child. See ART: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, supra note 34,
at 12. A surrogate carrier can be a genetic/gestational surrogate meaning that she is
both the genetic mother (her eggs are used) and the gestational mother (she carries
the baby). Id. A surrogate can also be purely gestational in that she serves as a carri-
er of an embryo that consists of egg and sperm extracted from two other people (the
intended parents). Id. In this situation, the surrogate carries the embryo for the
term of the pregnancy and gives birth to the child, but she has no biological connec-
tion to the child. Id. A gestational surrogate (surrogate carrier, but not her eggs)
has no legal rights to the child upon birth whereas a genetic/gestational surrogate
(surrogate carrier and her eggs) has waived such rights contractually, although such
contracts may or may not be found enforceable depending on which state law go-
verns. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 84-85;
CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 306-09 (2006); see also
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1737 (defining "surrogate" as "a per-
son who functions in another's life as a substitute for some third person such as a
relative who assumes the nurturing and other responsibilities of the absent parent").
37 A "gamete" is "[a]ny germ cell, whether ovum [egg] or spermatozoon
[sperm]." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 725.
Likewise, the donor offspring may or may not be related to the gestational car-
rier's male partner or husband depending on whether his sperm or donor sperm was
used.
924
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sperm. 9  Donor eggs and donor sperm are commonly used in IVF
procedures to facilitate pregnancy when a female or male has a prob-
lem producing or cannot produce gametes because of an infertility
40issue, age , or other factor, such as when one partner has an inherit-
able genetic disease.4 ' Today, donor eggs and donor sperm are also
used when a person wishes to conceive a child as a single parent, or
when a gay or lesbian couple decides to conceive a child through the
use of donor eggs or sperm.42 In the event both partners have infer-
tility problems that limit their ability to use their own eggs or sperm,
donor embryos may also be used in the IVF process.43 In fact, several
programs in the United States now offer embryo donation/ adoption
programs for couples that have undergone VF treatment and for
couples with infertility problems.44
A. Egg Donation
The first successful delivery of a child created through the use of
a donor egg occurred in 1984.45 Since then, the practice of egg do-
See Amy Harmon, Are You My Sperm Donor? Few Clinics Will Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2006, at Al.
40 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004 Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology Success Rates:National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports 52 (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART20O4/5O8PDF/2O04ARTIntro-NationalSumt508.pdf.
Figure forty shows that in 2004, the percentage of ART patients using donor eggs in-
creased dramatically at age thirty-nine and that ninety-one percent of women over
age forty-seven used donor eggs. Id. This reflects the reality that many women in the
modern age are waiting to have children because they are more involved in their ca-
reers. Because of this, age has become a major factor in female infertility problems
causing these women to use donor eggs if they want to be able to conceive a child.
41 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 43.
42 Id.; N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 74.
43 See ART: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, supra note 34, at 12. Some IVF programs allow
infertile couples that have undergone IVF treatment to donate their unused frozen
embryos to other infertile couples once they have become pregnant. See N.Y. STATE
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 299. This is an alternative to dispos-
ing of the embryos altogether. Id.
44 See Embryo Connection, http://www.embryoconnection.org (last visited Jan. 5,
2009) (providing information about medical and legal issues in the field of embryo
adoption provided by the National Embryo Donation Center in Knoxville, Tenn.).
The National Embryo Donation Center allows couples that have undergone IVF to
donate their embryos to the non-profit organization allowing other infertile couples
the opportunity to adopt such embryos. See National Embryo Donation Center,
http://www.embryodonation.org/donation.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). Because
the embryos are frozen, there is only a twenty to twenty-five percent chance of preg-
nancy per transfer as some embryos do not survive the freeze / thaw process. Id.
45 AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE FOR
PATIENTS 4 (2006) [hereinafter THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION]. In 1984, Louise Brown,
the first test-tube baby, was named "one of the ten most prominent people of the
20091
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nation in conjunction with IVF has grown tremendously. 46 In 2004,
approximately twelve percent of all ART cycles were performed with
47the use of donor eggs or embryos. In general, egg donors range
from age twenty to their mid-thirties, are healthy, and are both height
and weight proportional. 4s Donors can be either anonymous or non-
anonymous, as some recipients prefer to use eggs from a relative or
close friend.49  The majority of egg donors in the United States are
anonymous donors who are recruited specifically for egg donation.
In selecting egg donors, programs generally require donors to com-
plete extensive medical questionnaires indicating sexual history, sub-
stance abuse, and psychological history, while also requiring donors
to undergo a medical screening for communicable infections, diseas-
es, and inheritable diseases, as well as a psychological screening. ''
Once selected, the process of egg donation is not easy. Egg do-
nation is a time-consuming procedure, and the process for one cycle
can last up to six weeks. 52 The procedure involves taking medication
to stop the ovaries' normal functioning, followed by hormone injec-
tions, which stimulate the ovaries to produce a greater number of
eggs than a normal cycle .' During the administration of medication,
decade" by People magazine. See SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGEJ. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE
GENETICS AND THE LAW 223 (1987).
416 See Mark V. Sauer & Suzanne M. Kavic, Oocyte and Embryo Donation 2006: Review-
ing Two Decades of Innovation and Controversy, 12 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 153,
153 (2005).
47 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2004 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS
52 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART20O4/508PDF/20O4ARTIntro-
NationalSumt508.pdf.
48 SeeJUDITrl F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 229 n.3 (2006).
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine advises that donors should prefer-
ably be between twenty-one and thirty-four. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines
for Oocyte Donation, 82 FERTILITY AND STERILITY (Sept. 2004) at S14. Some agencies
and medical IVF programs have additional requirements. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND THE LA\w ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR? 5 (1998) [hereinafter THINKING OF BECOMING
AN EGG DONOR].
49 THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR, supra note 48, at 13.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 7-11.
52 Interview with Sharon Eyny, Egg Donation Coordinator, Center for Women's
Reproductive Care at Columbia University, in N.Y., N.Y. Uan. 17, 2008). There are
also several risks associated with egg donation. Id. However, out of a survey of 1000
egg donors, serious complications occurred in only 0.7%. See Mark V. Sauer, Defining
the Incidence of Serious Complications Experienced by Oocyte Donors: A Review of 1,000 Cases,
184 AM.J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 277 (2001).
53 See THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION, supra note 45, at 6. The process of producing
more than one egg as a result of taking fertility drugs is sometimes called superovula-
926
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a donor must have regular blood tests and ultrasound examinations
to allow doctors to monitor the number of ovulated eggs and deter-
mine how the donor is responding to the hormones. 54 Once the eggs
are harvested, they are removed from the donor's ovaries through a
minor surgical procedure called transvaginal ovarian aspiration, 5
which ordinarily lasts approximately thirty minutes. After the eggs
are retrieved, the donor loses control over them and is not entitled to
find out whether her eggs resulted in the birth of a child. 57 Upon
completion of the cycle, egg donors are compensated between $5000
and $8000 for their time, effort, and discomfort.
As set forth above, through the process of IVF, extracted eggs
are fertilized with sperm from either the recipient's partner-the in-
tended father-or another donor in a laboratory. 59 Once embryos
are formed, the embryos are transferred into the recipient's uterus in
the hope of resulting in a successful pregnancy. The recipient, the
tion. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at 77. The purpose of this procedure
is to increase the chances of a resulting pregnancy. Id.
54 THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR, supra note 48, at 16.
55 "Transvaginal" means "[a]cross or through the vagina." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1865. "Ovarian" refers to "[r] elating to the ovary." Id. at
1289. "Aspiration" means "[r]emoval, by suction, of a gas, fluid, or tissue from a
body cavity or organ from unusual accumulations, or from a container." Id. at 156.
56 THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR, supra note 48, at 17.
57 Id. at 19.
58 The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of
Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILIITYAND STERILITY 305 (Aug. 2007). Payment is not to be given
for the actual eggs retrieved as this raises controversial issues of commodifying the
body and coerciveness. Id. at 306. As such, ASRM recommends that "programs re-
cruiting [egg] donors.., establish a level of compensation that minimizes the possi-
bility of undue inducement of donors and the suggestion that payment is for the oo-
cytes themselves." Id. at 308. Many commentators question whether payment to egg
donors is excessive and advise that such payments be reduced or outlawed entirely.
See Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71 MT. SINAIJ. MED. 255,
255-65 (2004) (suggesting payment to egg donors be reduced to what is "reasonable
and fair," acknowledging arguments against high payments to egg donors, but re-
cognizing the need for egg donation programs and therefore the need for some
form of payment to donors); see also Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., EggDonor Compensa-
tion No Longer Threatened, 9 ASRM BULLETIN (2007),
http://www.asrm.org/Washington/
Bulletins/vol9no22.html (recognizing that Amendment 3389 to the Labor-HHS
funding bill, which would have made compensation of egg donors illegal, was
dropped); Naomi D. Johnson, Note, Excess Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption a New Solution
or a Temporary Fix?, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 853, 855 (2003) (establishing that there is little
government regulation in the field of IVF).
59 See supra Part II.
ro See ART: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, supra note 34, at 8. According to the Uniform
Parentage Act, "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2000).
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"gestational carrier,"6 1 will carry the embryo to term and give birth to
the child.62
B. Sperm Donation
Unlike egg donation, which is still a relatively new procedure,
sperm donation has been practiced since 1945.63 However, since the
emergence of the AIDS virus in the mid-1980s, artificial insemina-
tion 4 has generally been performed with frozen and quarantined
sperm that has been screened and tested for communicable diseas-
es. 65 Some states-for example, New York-allow the quarantine and
screening requirement to be waived when the donor is the regular
sexual partner of the recipient. 6 Most sperm donation agencies re-
quire donors to be between the ages of twenty-one and forty.6 ' Like
egg donors, sperm donors must undergo screening and testing pro-
cedures prescribed by the sperm bank, agency, or hospital before be-
68ing selected to be a donor. Prior to being selected, donors must
provide detailed medical information for at least two generations of
family members and undergo a blood analysis and a physical exami-
nation that tests for sexually transmitted diseases. 69 In addition, the
donor must provide a sample of sperm, which is frozen and thawed to
allow for post-freezing/ thawing semen parameters. 7  The semen
specimen is provided by means of self-masturbation and donors gen-
61 A "gestational carrier" is defined as "a woman who carries an embryo that was
formed from the egg of another woman. The gestational carrier usually has a con-
tractual obligation to return the infant to its intended parents." QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 72.
62 Id. at 52.
63 See THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION, supra note 45, at 9.
C4 "Artificial Insemination"-also referred to as assisted or intrauterine insemina-
tion-is a "medical procedure used to treat male factor infertility . . . or to assist
women with no male partner achieve pregnancy. Assisted insemination requires that
semen be obtained from the male, and then placed in the woman's reproductive
tract using an injection device." DAAR, supra note 48, at G-1.
65 See THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION, supra note 45, at 9; N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 235. The FDA and ASRM guidelines recom-
mend that sperm be quarantined for at least six months before being used in a pro-
cedure. See THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION, supra note 45, at 9.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.5(d) (2008); see N.Y. STATE TASK
FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 277 n.270.
67 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 245-54.
68 Id.
69 See THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION, supra note 45, at 10. According to FDA regula-
tions, infectious disease testing must be performed and documented as negative
within seven days of all sperm donations. Id.
70 Id.
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erally receive between $100 and $350 per vial, with two to three vials
needed per cycle. 71
Like egg donors, the majority of sperm donors choose to be
anonymous donors, but there are non-anonymous donors as well.72
As with egg donation, once sperm is donated, the anonymous sperm
donor relinquishes any right to control the specimen or to learn
whether or not a child is conceived with his sample. 3 In most situa-
tions, sperm donors enter into private contracts with sperm banks,
programs, and hospitals to be treated as anonymous donors.74 Some
sperm donors also enter contracts to relinquish parental rights and
avoid parental liability.75 While courts generally uphold such con-
tracts if they appear to represent the clear intent of both parties and
do not violate any fundamental public policy, 76 there are circums-
tances where courts may find paternity rights.17 Usually, this occurs
when the sperm donor has a relationship with the intended mother
or child, but claims to be an anonymous donor to escape being liable
for child support.18 Most states have enacted laws to address paternity
for children born to married women from artificial insemination
where the husband consents to be the father of the child. 79
71 See, e.g., Michael O'Brien, Donors for Dollars, EPREGNANCY.COM (Aug. 2003),
http://www.cryobank.com/-resources/pdf/News/ePregnancyAug03.pdf (providing
general information for sperm donors).
72 See THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION, supra note 45, at 9.
73 There is no federal law that establishes these restrictions. Rather, this issue is
governed by state law, or if a state does not have a law, it is governed by private con-
tract law. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 36, at 41-44.
74 It is unclear whether contracts guaranteeing anonymity to sperm donors would
be upheld in court or whether they would be found void as against public policy.
However, it is likely that a court would honor the intent of the parties and allow the
donor to remain anonymous in the absence of some compelling reason for disclo-
sure or any law permitting such disclosure. But see KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note
36, at 46 (stating that "[a] sperm bank cannot absolutely guarantee a donor that he
will always remain anonymous").
75 Id. at 41-42.
76 Id. at 42.
77 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding sperm donor could be awarded visitation rights to a child when he provided
semen directly to the mother who self-inseminated and did not comply with state sta-
tute regarding artificial insemination and non-paternity); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d
523, 525 (Ohio 1994) (finding paternity rights when an unmarried woman solicited a
donor known to her and promised donor that he will have no relationship with the
child).
78 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 36, at 37-41.
79 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1994). Other states have sta-
tutes that specifically state that a donor is not a parent. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-4-106(1)-(3) (2008); 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (Supp. 2008); TEX. FAM.
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Because sperm donation has been around for a longer period of
time than egg donation, courts have had the opportunity to rule on
many cases involving disputes over paternity and other legal issues in-
volving sperm donors.8° It is likely that in the future, courts will be
influenced by such rulings in deciding legal issues involving egg do-
nation, embryo donation,8' and other reproductive technology cas-82
es. However, the different nature of the procedures may pose new
challenges to application of rulings within the egg and embryo dona-
tion context.
83
Medical technologies in the field of assisted reproduction have
advanced rapidly, allowing infertility services to be more obtainable
to a greater number of people.8 4 As is usually the case, the law is slow
to accommodate this innovative medical technology. Perhaps this
slow development of law is due to the inherent political and religious
controversies implicated in the field of infertility. Regardless of the
reason, the legal issues associated with this field continue to emerge
as the family unit becomes less traditional, forcing the law to adapt
accordingly.
CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (A)(3) (2004); Wo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902 (2007).
80 See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at 29-71 (explaining the basics of
sperm donation and the case law that has developed as a result of the practice).
81 As of 2003, there were over 400,000 surplus cryopreserved embryos in the
United States. Debra Rosenberg, The War over Fetal Rights, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 2003,
at 40. As such, embryo adoption supporters are trying to educate infertile couples
about the possibility of adopting an embryo. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note
36, at 108 (citing David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and
Their Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063 (May 2003)).
Cytoplasmic egg donation is another medical procedure used today, which
may be used to increase the possibility that a woman will become pregnant.
KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at 76 n.3. More specifically, the procedure al-
lows genetic material from a more fertile woman to be transferred into the eggs of
the woman trying to become pregnant. Id. A child produced from this procedure
would thereby have two genetic mothers. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Comment
to address issues of disclosure of identifying information in this situation. However,
this shows how enactment of laws on the issue of donor disclosure could influence
future medical procedures in the field of ART.
83 For example, it is well recognized that egg donation is a more invasive proce-
dure than sperm donation, and given the fact that an egg donor may or may not also
be a gestational carrier, the legal issues that arise could be different than those that
have been addressed in the sperm donation context. Also, embryo donation
presents new legal issues in that multiple parties are involved.
84 KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at 8.
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III. STATE OF THE LAW TODAY
Many commentators and legal scholars have argued that there is
a pressing need for legislatures to address legal issues concerning do-
nor offspring because such children have reached the age of majori-
ty, or will be reaching this age in the near future, and many will likely
inquire about their rights to find out the identity of the donor that
assisted in their conception.' Children created through egg dona-
tion are currently twenty-five years of age or younger, while children
created through sperm donation may be much older. 86 While some
state and federal statutes have been enacted in the area of ART con-
cerning mandates for insurance coverage, 87 reporting of pregnancy
success rates from ART programs," registration of reproduction pro-
grams, 89 and regulation of issues involving maternity and paternity, 90
legislation governing this rapidly growing industry is sparse. 9' Of par-
ticular interest for the purpose of this Comment is the fact that there
is currently no state or federal law that expressly prohibits or enforces
the anonymity of gamete donation. 92 Instead, medical practitioners
are left with only legally non-binding professional guidelines that
provide recommendations and laws governing privacy with regard to
medical records.9 3 While the argument that legislatures should enact
more laws in the area of assisted reproduction is well founded, legis-
latures should not begin by regulating identifying information about
' See infra Part IV.
86 See supra Part ILA, B.
87 See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supa note 36, at 201 nn.35-40 (citing ARK. CODE
ANN. § 23-86-118(a) (2004); § 23-79-510; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (West 2004);
215 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/356-m (2005); CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(a) (West 2004); RAW.
REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5(a) (2004); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.003 (Vernon
2004)).
88 See id. at 197 (citing Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,
42. U.S.C. § 263a (2000)).
89 See id. at 196. The Food and Drug Administration requires all U.S. reproduc-
tion programs to be registered. See id. (citing Robert W. Rebar & Alan H. DeCher-
ney, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1603,
1603-04 (2004)).
90 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360 (2000).
91 Some states have attempted to regulate the ART field in terms of medical eval-
uations for gamete donors or recipients and regulations of surrogacy, but the majori-
ty of the ART field is highly unregulated. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at
207-13.
92 See Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16
HUM. REPROD. 818, 819 (2001).
93 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20; AM. SOC'Y FOR
REPROD. MED., COMPENDIUM OF ASRM PRACTICE COMMITIEE AND ETHICS COMMITTEE
REPORTS (2007) (publishing annual professional guidelines for medical practition-
ers).
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donors in the area of gamete donation as such legislation is prema-
ture and improper.
If state legislatures were to consider enacting laws on this sub-
ject, where would they look for guidance? Commentators who sup-
port enacting laws permitting or requiring disclosure of donor identi-
ty urge legislatures to be guided by trends in U.S. adoption law 4 and
a purported "developing trend in foreign legislation favoring identity
disclosure."95 However, as demonstrated below, whether such trends
actually exist is questionable at best. Others contend that the ab-
sence of legislation might be advantageous because it allows the field
of ART to grow without state interference, giving courts "an opportu-
nity to develop law as needed.
9 6
A. Adoption Law
In the context of adoption law "', the United States has seen a
great deal of change in the past ten years, as several states have recon-
sidered policies on sealed records, and some have enacted laws allow-
ing identifying information to be made available to adult adoptees. 98
In addition, several bills are under consideration in various states ad-
dressing the issues of disclosure of identifying information and provi-
sion of original birth certificates to adult adoptees.9 9 However, the
majority of states maintain that the identity of the birth parents will
remain confidential, and sealed records will be unsealed only for
94 See Elizabeth Siberry Chestney, Note, The Right to Know One's Genetic Origin:
Can, Should, or Must a State That Extends This Right to Adoptees Extend an Analogous Right
to Children Conceived with Donor Gametes, 80 TEX. L. REv. 365, 376 (2001) (citing Lori
B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic Informa-
tion, 8 HEALTH MATRIx 125, 147-48 (1998) (establishing that some states now have
open records and other states have established consent registries or provide for con-
fidential intermediaries)).
95 Jennifer A. Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identities: The Importance of
Genetic Awareness and Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure for Children Born from
Gamete Donations in the United States, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 116, 120 (2007).
96 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 36, at 196.
97 JOHN YEH & MOLLYYEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILrIY 142 (1991). "Adoption is
defined as 'the overall legal process by which a parent who is not the natural parent
of a child becomes legally recognized as that child's parent.'" Id. (quoting Comment,
Advertising for Adoption Placement: Gray Market Activities in a Gray Area of Constitutional
Protection, 25 DUQ. L. REv. 129, 129 (1986)).
98 See MADELYN FREUNDLICH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, FOR THE
REcORDS: RESTORING A LEGAL RIGHT FOR ADULT ADOPTEES 10-11 (2007), available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/20071 1For Records.pdf (provid-
ing commentary on state legislative action on adoption).
See Am. Adoption Cong., http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/state.
php (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (setting forth state legislation on birth certificate access
for adopted adults in all states as well as state bills under consideration).
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"good cause shown,"' ° determined by the court.'0 ' In states that re-
quire a court order for individuals to obtain sealed records, some
courts have stated that an "expectation of confidentiality arising from
an adoption statute is constitutionally protected as a right of priva-
cy.,,0 2 Further, despite challenges brought by adoptees arguing that
sealed adoption records violate the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, courts have consistently held that access to adoption
records is not a fundamental right.
0 3
Among those states that have reconsidered their position on
sealed records in the adoption law context, some have enacted laws
that apply prospectively while others have laws that apply retroactive-
ly.'04  The specifics of the laws vary greatly. 10 5 For example, some
states allow for the original birth certificate-with the original birth-
parents' names listed-to be given to the adoptee. 0 6 Some states
provide this right, but also provide the birth parent with a veto right
(if exercised, the adoptee cannot get the records).1°7 Some states al-
low for identifying information to be given to adult adoptees, but give
birthparents a contact veto which, if exercised, prevents the adoptee
100 See Doe v. Ward Law Firm, P.A., 579 S.E.2d 303, 306 (S.C. 2003) (finding adop-
tive parents established "good cause" as to why releasing information pertaining to a
child's adoption was in the child's best interest as the child had medical and psychia-
tric problems); Bradey v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422
(S.C. 1981) (finding that Bradey's mere desire to access information about his bio-
logical parents does not constitute "good cause" to unseal the records in light of the
fact that he has been raised by his adopted family in a healthy environment).
101 Despite some legal commentators' argument that there seems to be a trend
moving towards favoring open disclosure in the United States, the majority of states
do not allow adoptees to obtain this information without a court order. See
FREUNDLICH, supra note 98, at 10 n.3.
102 Bradey, 274 S.E.2d at 421; see also Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F.Supp. 912,
916 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979).
103 See YEH &YEH, supra note 97, at 156; see, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751,
753-54 (Ill. 1981) (holding that adoptees have no constitutional right to see their
adoption records and determine their biological origin); Fineberg v. Suffolk Div. of
the Probate and Family Court Dep't, 644 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (stat-
ing that curiosity about biological roots is not enough to show good cause and there-
by denying adult adoptee access to her adoption records).
104 See Am. Adoption Cong., supra note 99 (establishing that Tennessee's law,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (2004), allowing access to sealed records, was applied
retroactively). Maine's law, 22 MRSA §2768 (2009), allowing such access was applied
prospectively as ofJanuary 1, 2009. Id.
105 See FREUNDLICH, supra note 98, at 10-11; see also Am. Adoption Cong., supra
note 99.
106 See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, ACCESS TO ADOPTION REcORDs:
SUMMARY OF STATE LAws, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
lawspolicies/statutes/inforaccessapall.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (citing Alaska
[Alaska Code § 18.50.500], Kansas [Ann. Stat. § 65-2423]).
107 Id. (citing Delaware [Ann. Code Tit. 13, 923]).
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from being able to make any attempt to contact the birth parent.108
Meanwhile, other states allow parents to file a "non-binding Contact
Preference Form."'109 Also, some states provide for total open disclo-
sure,"0 while others provide for disclosure only upon court order."'
In addition, as of September 2007, some states allow adult adoptees
born before or after a certain date to access their original birth certif-
icates unless the birthparent(s) has filed a non-consent form."2
Those commentators who argue that donor offspring should
have the right to access identifying donor information maintain that
gamete donation is similar enough to adoption such that the same
arguments for disclosure are applicable.13  One commentator even
questions whether it is unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause for states to have legislation allowing adult adop-
tees to obtain identifying information about their birth parents but
not have a similar law on this subject for donor offspring. 14 However,
an equal protection challenge would likely fail because a court could
find that there are enough differences between adoptees and donor
offspring that they would not be considered "similarly situated per-
sons." Because donor offspring may have similar interests in ob-
taining identifying information about their donors as adoptees have
in accessing information about their birth parents, it is appropriate to
consider adoption law to facilitate the debate, but it should not be
conclusive."'
108 Id. (citing Alabama [Ala. Code § 22-9A-12(c)-(d)], Tennessee [Ann. Code §§
36-1-128; 36-1-129]).1o Id. (citing Alabama [Ala. Code § 22-9A-12(c)-(d)], Colorado [Rev. Stat. § 19-5-
305]).
11 Id. (both Alaska [Alaska Code § 18.50.500] and Kansas [Ann. Stat. § 65-2423]
never had closed records).
I FREUNDLICH, supra note 98, at 33 n.3 ("In approximately 29 states, the District
of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, and Puerto Rico, a court order continues to
be required for an adult adopted person to gain access to his/her original birth cer-
tificate.").
112 ACCESS TO ADOPTION RECORDS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAws, supra note 106 (citing
Hawaii [Rev. Stat. §578-15], Maryland [Fam. Law §§ 5-359; 5-3A-42; 5-3B-29], Minne-
sota [Ann. Stat. §259.89], Nebraska [Rev. Stat. §§43-131; 43-146.05], Oklahoma
[Ann. Stat. Tit. 10, § 7505-6.6], and Washington [Rev. Code § 26.33.345]).
1 See infra Part IV (discussing specific arguments as to why adult adoptees should
have access to identifying information about their birth parents).
14 See Chestney, supra note 94, at 378.
"5 See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (establishing
that the Equal Protection Clause requires that persons similarly situated be treated
similarly).]I6 See infra Part IV.
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B. Regulation of Gamete Donation in Other Countries
Outside the United States, several countries have actively sought
to regulate the field of ART, and some have enacted laws on the issue
of anonymous gamete donation. 1 7 According to the Council of Eu-
rope Steering Committee of Bioethics Report, the following countries allow
donor offspring to be provided with the identity of the donor: Aus-
tria, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and Canada."" For example, in Norway, sec-
tion 2-7 of the Norwegian Law on the Human-Medical use of Bio-
technology states: "A person born in consequence of Assisted Repro-
duction with the use of donor sperm has the right to identifying
information on the sperm donor at the age of 18 years. A donor reg-
ister shall assist the child in this matter."" 9 More recently, the United
Kingdom enacted similar legislation on donor anonymity under the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which was
applied prospectively beginning April 1, 2005. 120
Although many countries do not have laws governing this issue,
some commentators argue that there is a trend moving toward open
disclosure in Europe and other countries. 12' This is debatable be-
cause several countries currently have statutes that prevent donor
offspring from receiving identifying information about the donor, in-
cluding Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,
Greece, Latvia, Poland, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Montene-
gro, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Israel. 2  While the laws vary, some seem
"17 See Frith, supra note 92, at 819. In 1984, Sweden was the "first country to re-
move the anonymity of gamete" donation by enacting Law No. 1140, which allowed
donor children "to find out the identity of their sperm donor" when sufficiently ma-
ture. Id. Other countries followed by enacting similar legislation. Id.
118 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STEERING COMMIrF'EE OF BIoETHcs REPORT 69 (2005),
available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal-affairs/legal_co-operation/bioethics/texts
_anddocuments/INF_2005_7%20e%20MAP.pdf.
19 See European Soc'y for Human Reprod. & Embryology, Norwegian Legislation:
Norwegian Law on the Human-Medical Use of Biotechnology http://www.eshre.com/
ESHRE/English/Legal-Matters-and-Guidelines/Legal-documentation/Norway/Don
or-anonymity/page.aspx/ 186 (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
10 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., Donating Sperm, Eggs or Embyros,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/donating-sperm-eggs-or-embryos-0609.pdf (last vi-
sited Feb. 3, 2009).
121 See Frith, supra note 92, at 819. Other countries that have enacted legislation
include Holland, two jurisdictions in Australia (Victoria, Western Australia), and New
Zealand. Id.
l2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 118, at 69; see also Ruth Landau, The Manage-
ment of Genetic Origins: Secrecy and Openness in Donor Assisted Conception in Israel and
Elsewhere, 13 HUM. REPROD. 3268, 3268 (1998) (arguing that Israel's refusal to provide
donor children with a right to their "genetic identity" is inconsistent with Israel's
20091 935
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to leave little room for interpretation on this controversial issue. For
example, according to the Indian Council of Medical Research, in
India, "'the child born through the use of donor gametes [i.e., sperm
or eggs] will not have any right whatsoever to know the identity of the
genetic parents.' 123
If state legislators were to consider whether to enact laws on the
issue of disclosure, it is possible that they may consider what other
countries have done, but it is unlikely. The United States places
greater emphasis on individual liberties than some other countries
and is hesitant to interfere with people's fundamental rights. Be-
cause our government is less inclined to regulate people's personal
lives and family decisions than governments of other countries, it may
be inappropriate to look to international law when considering this
issue.
In analyzing whether state legislatures will be influenced to pass
laws pertaining to disclosure of donor identity because other coun-
tries have done so, it is also important to recognize that many coun-
tries treat adoption law and the issue of sealed records very differently
than the issue is treated in the United States. In fact, unlike the
United States, many countries never had a closed-records system in
place for adoption records. '4 For example, Norway'2 5 has never rec-
ognized closed adoption records. 26 Because adult adoptees have al-
ways been able to access information about their birthparents, Nor-
way's treatment of the disclosure of donor identity to donor offspring
seems to be consistent with its policy on the issue of disclosure.
Therefore, it may be impractical for state legislators to consider the
approaches other countries, like Norway, have taken on adoption,
"well established policy of openness in the field of adoption and on the emerging
trend to similar openness in donor assisted conception in other countries").
12 INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL
CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN'S NEEDS 11 (2006), available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/parenthood.pdf [hereinafter REVOLUTION IN
PARENTHOOD].
124 See Origins Canada: Supporting People Separated By Adoption, Open Records,
http://www.originscanada.org/openrecords/open_records_facts.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Origins Canada]. The following nations never had a
closed-records system for adoption records: Finland, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Norway,
and Israel. Id. In addition, the following countries have reconsidered policies on the
issue of closed records and now have open-records systems: Scotland (since 1930),
Great Britain (since 1975), Australia (since 1991), and New Zealand (since 1985).
125 See supra Part III.B (noting Norway as one country that permits donor offspring
to access identifying information about donors by law).
126 See Origins Canada, supra note 124.
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since the majority of states in the United States are governed by
closed-record statutes. 
1 27
It is more likely that state legislatures will draw parallels between
similar issues raised in American family law and more specifically,
American adoption law. Even if state legislators were to consider the
approaches some countries have taken with regard to permitting dis-
closure of donor identities, there is no real evidence that a trend to-
ward open disclosure, as referenced above, really exists. There seems
to be an equal number of countries, if not more, that refuse to allow
donor offspring to receive identifying information. 
128
IV. STATE LAWS PERMITTING OR REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF
DONOR IDENTITY SHOULD NOT BE ENACTED
Arguments that laws should be enacted permitting or requiring
disclosure of donor identity are ill-advised. Commentators who sup-
port the enactment of such laws routinely justify their position by
pointing to the child's "right to know where they came from" without
looking at the full picture. 129 Conveniently, commentators fail to dis-
close the fact that no court has ever declared that donor offspring
have a fundamental right to access identifying information about do-
nors.130 The reality is there are at least three parties 3' involved in an
127 In addition, it may also be impractical because in some countries there is a
recognized "right" on behalf of the child to access such information whereas the
United States has yet to recognize any fundamental "right" to this information de-
spite some legal commentators' arguments that it should. See, e.g., United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 47 (es-
tablishing that "the child shall .. .have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his
or her parents"). The United States has yet to sign the convention. REVOLUTION IN
PARENTHOOD, supra note 123, at 16 & 36 n.32.
128 See supra Part III.B.
129 See, e.g., Baines, supra note 95, at 118; Chestney, supra note 94, at 365; Frith,
supra note 92, at 820; Amy Shelf, Note, A Need to Know Basis: Record Keeping, Informa-
tion Access, and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
1047, 1071 (2000).
130 See, e.g., Baines, supra note 95, at 118 (discussing a child born through gamete
donation's general right to know "the truth concerning [his or her] . .. conception
and origins," but omitting the fact that there is no fundamental right to such know-
ledge in the United States). Further, as support for this proposition, a commentator
erroneously cites a source from the United Kingdom, which does recognize such a
right. See id. at 118 n.27.
131 As noted throughout this Comment, there are potentially many other interests
involved in an IVF procedure related to parties such as the doctor, egg donation or
sperm donation program, surrogate carrier, and the State.
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IVF procedure, each of whom has very different interests-none of
which have been recognized as "fundamental." 1
2
The child's interest involves individual autonomy, a desire to
know his or her biological mother or father, and a longing not to be
denied identifying information when the child was never a party to
the original arrangement. 133 The donor, on the other hand, has an
interest in maintaining anonymity.3 4 The donor may have entered
into a private contract guaranteeing that his or her identity would
remain confidential.135 In many cases, the promise of confidentiality
plays an essential role in the donor's decision to donate gametes. 136
Lastly, the intended parents have an interest in raising their children
and making personal family decisions without unwarranted state in-
terference.137 Perhaps on the surface these interests fall within rec-
ognized fundamental rights such as the right to privacy,""' the right to
procreate, and the right to keep the family together.'3 9 However, no
court has yet ruled that any of these specific interests fall within the
realm of the aforementioned constitutional rights, and it is unlikely
that a court would deem any of these interests to be fundamental
rights at this time. Further, it is not useful to view the competing in-
terests as possibly within the purview of the general right to privacy
132 While case law has given some indication of what liberties the Supreme Court
deems to be "fundamental," much is left to be determined. In determining whether
a right is fundamental, one may look to whether the fight is enumerated in the Con-
stitution (an express right) or has been deemed "fundamental" by the Supreme
Court (an implied right). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 795 (2006). At times, courts also look to history and tradition as a
means of deciding what rights not mentioned in the Constitution are nevertheless
"fundamental." Id. If a right is recognized as "fundamental," the government can-
not infringe on this right unless "its action is necessary to achieve a compelling gov-
ernment purpose." Id. at 792.
133 See infra Part IV.A-1.
1 See infra Part IV.A-2.
'35 See generaly KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at 295-301.
36 See supra Part I (establishing that Lindsay Cooper would not donate eggs at a
program that would not accept anonymous donors).
S3q See infra Part IV.A-3.
138 While there is a fundamental right to privacy and within that fight, an ability to
control certain private information about oneself, it is not all-encompassing. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 855. The State may utilize its broad police power to
enact laws to serve the interests of its citizens, even though those laws have some ef-
fect on individual liberty or privacy, so long as they are reasonable. See id. at 677-89.
If a state law intrudes on a fight that is not recognized as "fundamental," strict scru-
tiny review is not applicable. Id. at 794. While there is generally more deference
shown to the State in this situation than when a recognized "fundamental" fight is at
issue, the court may still find the law invalid. See id. at 678.
139 Id. at 792.
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because it is difficult, if not impossible, to rank the competing inter-
ests of the parties in order of importance.40
For the reasons set forth above, the issue of disclosure of donor
identity should not be characterized as a constitutional issue. Rather,
it is more appropriate to evaluate the competing interests as a public
policy matter, balancing the interests of the parties and also taking
into consideration factors such as the legal and practical conse-
quences likely to result from the enactment of laws permitting or re-
quiring disclosure of donor identity. An analysis of the competing in-
terests suggests that the issues involved in one IVF procedure are
truly unique and different from the next. Thus, a sweeping law on
the issue of disclosure of donor identity applicable to all donor
offspring is inappropriate. Legislatures should not respond to this
sensitive issue by enacting laws that appear to provide a short-term so-
lution to a complicated issue with the potential to harm all three par-
ties in the long run.
A. Competing Interests Between Parties Involved in an IVF Procedure
1. The Child's Interest
Advocates for laws permitting or requiring disclosure of donor
identity argue that children created by means of ART have an interest
in finding both their genetic heritage and the identities of their ge-
netic parents.14 In addition, a child may desire an opportunity to in-
itiate a relationship with a genetic parent or to find out whether he or
she has any siblings. While the above-referenced interests may be
considered legitimate, they should be balanced against the donor's
140 If a court found that a donor has a fundamental right to donate gametes ano-
nymously, the State would likely be unable to demonstrate a compelling need to in-
terfere, and a law permitting or requiring disclosure of donor identity would fail.
However, it is unlikely that a court would recognize this right as "fundamental" at
this time because the law is still rather undeveloped in the area of assisted reproduc-
tion and courts have yet to recognize whether assisted reproduction is itself a funda-
mental fight. See Daar, supra note 48, at 137. But seeJOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN
OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22-40 (1994) (ar-
guing that ART is a fundamental ight). Also, courts will likely be hesitant to recog-
nize a donor's ight to donate gametes anonymously because it potentially encourag-
es commoditization of the body. Therefore, because none of the specific competing
interests addressed in this Comment have been deemed "fundamental," an analysis
of the interests as a matter or public policy is more appropriate.
141 See Chestney, supra note 94, at 365. For purposes of this Comment, the author
uses the term "genetic parent" as opposed to "birth parent" because the Comment is
not referring to parents who gave birth to their children. Rather, the Comment is
referring to donors that are genetically related to the child, but did not carry or give
birth to the child.
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interest in maintaining anonymity. Commentators who support the
enactment of general laws providing donor offspring with the right to
access identifying information argue that such knowledge is necessary
to a child's positive upbringing and that states should implement
such legislation to do what is in the "best interest" of these child-
ren. 1 There are several problems with this argument.
First, this argument is flawed because it relies on the assumption
that disclosure of the donor identity to the child is in the best interest
of all donor offspring. There is no evidence that knowledge of iden-
tifying information is necessary to the well-being of donor offspring,
nor is there evidence that knowledge of such information is always
beneficial. 143  In support of their position in favor of disclosure,
commentators often draw parallels between donor offspring and
adoptee children and attempt to impute the same line of reasoning
as to why knowledge of biological information is necessary to child-
ren.144 However, unlike adoptees, donor offspring are in most cases
biologically related to one of their parents.145 Therefore, the argu-
ment that such children need to find out where they came from is
not as strong in the ART context. 146 This argument also ignores the
fact that donor offspring are likely to have been raised in a positive
and nurturing family environment.147  Knowledge of the donor's
identity might not be beneficial for the child if such knowledge caus-
es tension between the child and his or her intended parents.
The argument that laws permitting or requiring disclosure of
donor identity are in the "best interest" of donor offspring is also
problematic because it overemphasizes genetics and underemphasiz-
es the bonds created by a lifetime of nurturing from the child's actual
caregivers (intended parents). According to one psychologist, "[a]
genetic relationship is not essential for good social parenting or the
satisfactory social and emotional development of children."' 14 Disclo-
sure laws might also have a negative effect on future generations of
donor offspring as they could encourage donor offspring to seek to
142 See id. at 375-76, 380; Baines, supra note 95, at 118.
143 See Landau, supra note 122, at 3269-70. In addition, many physicians and
some commentators argue that knowledge of such information is not beneficial for
the child. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 94 at 127.
I" See, e.g., Baines, supra note 95, at 121-26; Chestney, supra note 94, at 376.
145 See Chestney, supra note 94, at 375.
146 Id.
147 See Interview with Sharon Eyny, supra note 52.
148 Susan Golombok, Rachel Cook & Alison Bish Families Created by the New Repro-
ductive Technologies: Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the
Children, 66 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 285-98 (1995).
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establish relationships with donors at the expense of potential harm
to the child's family when donor offspring might never have wanted
such information. 4 9 Such laws suggest that knowledge of this identi-
fying information is necessary to a donor offspring's wellbeing, which
is problematic.
Knowledge of a donor's identity might also stigmatize the
child' 50 and could have other negative consequences if, for example,
a donor offspring contacts his or her donor and is rejected. It is un-
realistic to expect that donors who agreed to be anonymous donors
would welcome disclosure laws.15 In fact, it is likely that donors
would not react positively if confronted by donor offspring later in
life. 15
Second, it is erroneous to maintain that the State has an obliga-
tion to give donor offspring the right to access identifying informa-
tion about donors. Enacting a state law on this issue requires the
State to interfere and affirmatively assert that it has a strong interest
53
that outweighs the interest of the donor in maintaining his or her
anonymous status, essentially giving the donor offspring a positive
right. 15 4 As set forth above, many advocates for laws allowing for dis-
closure of donor identity urge state legislators to look to adoption law
for guidance. 155  However, the State plays a very different role in
149 See Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 150, 186 (1999). "Genetic essential-
ism" has been defined as the "concept that a person is the sum of her genes and that
behavior can be predicted based on genetic information." Id. Doctors and psychol-
ogists routinely stress that society places too great an emphasis on genetic connec-
tions as defining the relationship between parent and child. For example, a person
is not half his or her mother and half his or her father. Rather, a person contains an
entirely different genetic makeup that is unique to that person.
0 See Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the
Past, 57 ALB. L. REv. 733, 761-62 (1994).
15' See supra Part 1.
152 Lindsay Cooper did not tell her mother or boyfriend about donating eggs. Id.
In turn, one can imagine that she would not react positively to being confronted by
her donor offspring in the future. It is also important to recognize that this reaction
could be rather detrimental to a child in search to find out who he or she is, only to
be rejected.
153 The State would need to show it has a compelling interest if the court recog-
nized the donor's right to maintain an anonymous status as a fundamental right. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 792.
1 The U.S. Constitution protects negative rights as opposed to positive rights. Id.
at 551-53. A negative right is a right to be left alone and to not have the State inter-
fere with a right one already has whereas a positive right is one that is given by the
State. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't. Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In
the scenario addressed by this Comment, the State has not acted and is not obligated
to act as what is being asked for is a positive right.
155 See supra Part III.A.
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adoption law than it does in gamete donation. The State is already
involved in adoption proceedings because "adoption is a state-created
process and status.""' 6 Therefore, it is easier for the State to show that
it has a strong interest in regulating identifying information about
adoptee birthparents than to show it has a compelling interest in re-
gulating gamete donation. 157 In the gamete donation context, the
State has not acted. The State has not denied donor offspring the
right to find out their genetic origin. Rather, it has merely left itself
out of an already crowded contractual relationship. Advocates for
disclosure cannot simply point to the fact that the State has been able
to show that it has a strong interest in regulating disclosure of such
information in the adoption law context to support an argument that
states will be able to establish a strong interest in the context of ga-
mete donation.
Aside from some of the more obvious interests previously ad-
dressed, donor offspring may have rather specific and distinct inter-
ests at different points in time. For example, at some point a child
might have an interest in contacting the donor if he or she needs a
bone marrow transplant or perhaps is in need of financial support.
This Comment does not suggest that a child would be able to assert a
claim for bone marrow or financial aid. Rather, the examples illu-
strate that the specific interests of each donor offspring child are
unique, and in some cases a child's interest in finding out identifying
information about the donor may be more than to satisfy mere cu-
riosity and perhaps in certain limited circumstances this interest
would override the donor's interest to remain anonymous. Proper
adjudication of these cases must involve balancing the individual
child's interests against his or her donor's interest in privacy. In
forming a balancing test, it may be appropriate for legislatures to
look to how some courts have decided whether "good cause" is shown
to permit adoptees to access their original birth certificate.58
156 Cahn & Singer, supra note 149, at 190.
157 The majority of states still recognize a sealed records system for such records
and only allow adoptees to access identifying information about their birthparents
for "good cause shown." See supra Part III.A.158 See Doe v. Ward Law Finn, P.A., 579 S.E.2d 303, 306 (S.C. 2003) (finding adop-
tive parents established "good cause" as to why releasing information pertaining to
child's adoption was in the child's best interest as child had medical and psychiatric
problems); Bradey v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C.
1981) (finding that Bradey's mere desire to access information about his biological
parents does not constitute "good cause" to unseal the records in light of the fact
that he has been raised by his adopted family in a healthy environment); supra Part
IMI.A.
942 [Vol. 39:919
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 942 2009
COMMENT9
2. The Donor's Interest
Perhaps the strongest argument against the enactment of laws al-
lowing donor offspring to access identifying information about do-
nors is that such laws violate the donor's privacy interest and reason-
able expectation to maintain anonymity and confidentiality. 9 In be-
becoming an egg or sperm donor, the donor generally participated
in a medical procedure in exchange for payment.G In doing this,
donors did not decide to become parents. While some donors be-
come donors because of a genuine desire to help a family conceive
children, others are motivated solely by the financial incentive.' 6' Ei-
ther way, donors who enter programs as anonymous donors have a
reasonable expectation that their identity will not be made available
to potential donor offspring. Legislators must balance this strong in-
terest against the child's interest in wanting to learn the identity of
the donor.
While advocates for laws permitting or requiring disclosure of
donor identity maintain that donor offspring want to know the iden-
tity of the donor, one can presume that knowledge of a donor's iden-
tity is really only a small part of what some want. Rather, many donor
offspring want to initiate a relationship with their donor. In balanc-
ing the interests, legislatures must ask themselves whether it is appro-
priate to give donor offspring the right, albeit indirectly, to contact a
donor and initiate a relationship with him or her if such a relation-
ship is not wanted. In the adoption law context, some states have al-
lowed adoptees to access their original birth certificates, but have
provided birthparents with a contact veto, in an attempt to balance
the competing interests of the birthparents and the children. 62 If
such laws were to be enacted in the area of gamete donation, similar
issues would need to be considered. If states were to implement this
approach, there may be no point in enacting the law at all as donor
offspring may not have as strong an interest in accessing the informa-
tion when compared to the donor's privacy interest.
As previously stated, upon completion of the donation process, a
donor relinquishes all rights to his or her gametes and has no right to
know whether or not a child was conceived with his or her genetic
composition. 163 Due to advanced medical technology in the field of
ART, involving embryo freezing, donor offspring could potentially be
159 See Baines, supra note 95, at 119-20; Chestney, supra note 94, at 384.
1 See Interview with Sharon Eyny, supra note 52.
161 Id.
162 See supra Part III.A.
1 See supra Part II.
2009] 943
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 943 2009
SETON HALL LA W REVIEW
born many years after the donor donated gametes.'64 Additionally, it
is possible that more than one child could result from one donation
cycle.1 65 While some donors may be properly informed of these pos-
sibilities, some donors may not be. Instead, donors are informed of
the medical procedure involved in the donation and little, if any-
thing, is discussed about the child that may or may not result.'6 6 Pay-
ment is not intended to be for the gametes themselves. 167 Presumably
all donors would agree that the payment received is not equivalent to
the value of a lifelong commitment to a child the donor is not even
allowed to know was created.
In balancing the interests of donor offspring and donors, legisla-
tures must consider whether it is reasonable to hold donors account-
able indefinitely for decisions that could have been made more than
twenty years earlier when the donors were very young. Allowing do-
nor offspring to access identifying information about the donor in-
evitably provides the donor offspring with an opportunity to initiate
contact with the donor. Unlike in the adoption law context where a
birthmother is permitted to change her mind about giving up a child
at any point up until the birth of the child, a gamete donor loses con-
trol over the gamete well before a child is ever conceived. 16 A ga-
mete donor is thus denied the ability to reflect on the decision and to
change his or her mind. The reasoning behind this practice is that
the interest of the child and the intended parents prevail. As a policy
matter, it is inconsistent to allow a birthmother and a surrogate carri-
er-using her egg-to change her mind, but deny this opportunity to
a donor, even though it seems to be more administratively feasible. If
that is the case, then why must the donor's interest in maintaining
anonymity be compromised yet again?
A hypothetical illustrates some of these concerns. Presume ten
years from now Lindsay Cooper"6 9 is married and raising three child-
ren. Subsequent to the enactment of a law permitting donor
CA See generally QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 57.
65 Id. at 53.
166 See Interview with Sharon Eyny, supra note 52.
167 See supra Part II.A; supra note 58. Some have argued that payment to donors,
in particular egg donors, is coercive and perhaps donors are not as aware as they
should be about what it means to donate eggs. See Thomas J. Papadimos & Alexa T.
Papadimos, The Student and the Ovum: The Lack of Autonomy and Informed Consent in
Trading Genes for Tuition, 2 REPROD. BIOL. ENDOCRINOL. 56 (2004) (questioning
whether egg donors are adequately informed on egg donation and whether high
payments to egg donors is coercive).
168 See supra Part II.A-B.
,0 See supra Part I.
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offspring to access identifying donor information, Lindsay is con-
fronted by her donor offspring against her will. How might this affect
her relationship with her children and husband? Perhaps her inter-
est in maintaining anonymity is heightened due to the fact that other
people in her life could be impacted as a result of disclosure. Fur-
ther, assume she is very religious and that knowledge of her having
served as an egg donor might stigmatize her in her religious commu-
nity. 17° Assume the donor offspring in this hypothetical has been
raised by a wonderful and loving family, but longs to have a relation-
ship with Lindsay. While Lindsay may welcome such a relationship,
she may not-nothing requires her to embrace her donor offspring.
In this situation, it seems that the donor offspring's interest in access-
ing a record with Lindsay's name, coupled with no right to thereafter
form a relationship with her, should be outweighed by Lindsay's in-
terest in maintaining anonymity. 171
Allowing donor offspring to have access to identifying donor in-
formation without balancing the competing interests of donors in
maintaining an anonymous status is unreasonable. In this sensitive
area, it is hard to separate oneself from the obvious emotions in-
volved, but this is not an issue that can be decided on morals alone.
It is one that must be looked at through an objective and non-
judgmental lens. The best way to address this intricate matter is by
balancing the competing interests involved in each instance on a
case-by-case basis.
3. The Intended Parents' Interest
The third party to an IVF procedure, the intended parents, have
yet another interest in the enactment of laws permitting or requiring
disclosure of donor identity. Their interest should not be under-
mined in the balancing of the competing interests at stake because,
as a matter of public policy, the State should not discourage people
from having children, even in the most unconventional of ways. In
the ART context, the intended parents have been through a great
170 See generally QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 29
(providing issues some religions consider as to whether or not a religion approves of
use of ART). Many religions do not approve of ART. See generally Deepa Kharb, As-
sisted Reproductive Techniques Ethical and Legal Concerns, 4 INTERNET J. LAW,
HEALTHCARE & ETHICS (2d ed. 2007).
171 This Comment does not suggest that all donors have the same interest in main-
taining a confidential status. Nor does it suggest that donor offspring should not be
able to contact those donors who welcome such a relationship. See infra Part V (de-
scribing donor and donor sibling registries as options available to those who wel-
come contact).
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struggle. The intended parents have likely invested a great deal of
time, energy, and money to conceive a child they planned to raise
and provide for.1 72 In many cases, the intended parents went through
several cycles of IVF prior to their decision to use a donor and only
then decided to use donor gametes after it was determined that this
was the only way to achieve a pregnancy. 7 The intended parents' in-
terest is unique in that it is two-sided. This party has an interest that
encompasses aspects of their being individuals, as well as their being
parents and wanting to do what they believe is best for their child.
As other commentators have observed, many couples that have
undergone IVF have decided not to inform their children of their
genetic origins, despite almost universal recommendations urging
parents to disclose this information.174  Parents' reasons for non-
disclosure differ greatly. 75 Because there is no law mandating disclo-
sure, couples are free to decide whether or not to share this informa-
tion with their children."17 If laws are enacted permitting or requir-
ing disclosure of donor identity, more families might decide not to
inform their children of their genetic background. The practical im-
plication that such laws might result in less information being given
to donor offspring and even more secrecy should be considered by
legislatures when analyzing this issue.
If laws permitting or requiring disclosure of donor identity are
enacted, parents might have legitimate reasons for not informing
their children of their genetic origin. For example, they might not
think it would be in their child's best interest to know such informa-
tion, especially if it could lead to their child's rejection by the donor.
Another reason might be concern that a relationship between the
child and donor could undermine their own relationship with their
172 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSABOUT INFERTILITY, supra note 21, at 59-63.
173 See Interview with Sharon Eyny, supra note 52.
174 In a study conducted in 1994, seventy-three percent of couples reported that
they would not tell their children if such children were conceived through IVF. Mary
CaseyJacob, Susan C. Klock & Donald Maier, A Prospective Study of Donorl nsemination
Recipients: Secrecy, Privacy and Disclosure, 62 FERTILITYAND STERILITY 477, 481 (1994).
Some of the reasons given for why parents would not tell their children such
information include: concern for the best interest of the child, to protect the child or
couple from the stigma of infertility, right to privacy, and a desire to feel like a nor-
mal family. See id. at 482. In the past, doctors and IVF programs recommended that
parents not tell their children about the IVF procedure. See Interview with Sharon
Eyng, supra note 52.
6 It is much easier for families that have undergone IVF treatment to keep this
information secret than for families that have gone through adoption proceedings as
the gestational mother carries the embryo to term and delivers the baby. SeeJacob,
supra note 174, at 482.
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child. The intended parents have an interest in keeping their family
together and protecting their children. These parents would likely
also object to the enactment of laws that permit or require disclosure
of donor identity on the grounds stated above, that such laws over-
emphasize the importance of knowledge of identifying donor infor-
mation and are misleading in that they could give donor offspring a
false hope that donors will welcome contact and relationships with
them.
While the intended parents' interest is different than that of the
donor offspring or the donor in that it is more removed, it is never-
theless important. This interest should be considered both as its own
matter and as part of the balancing of the child's interest. In addi-
tion, the concerns addressed above should be noted as practical con-
sequences that could result from the enactment of such laws. As a
policy matter, it is appropriate to respect the intended parents' status
as the legal parents and not to exclude their interest in the balancing
and treatment of these cases on an individual basis.
B. Reliance Issues and Contract Law
If donor identity disclosure laws are considered and/or enacted,
such laws should only be applied prospectively. 177 When egg donors
such as Lindsay Cooper178 signed informed consent agreements 79 be-
fore undergoing treatment, they were likely not advised of the possi-
bility that laws could later be enacted permitting their donor
offspring to access identifying information about them. 8 0  Rather,
most donors were advised of the ordinary medical risks involved in
the IVF procedure, and as far as legal concerns, were advised that
upon retrieval and donation of their eggs, they would lose control of
the eggs and would never be entitled to know whether a child was
conceived.1" Therefore, in signing such agreements, the donors rea-
177 There is an assumption that laws permitting or requiring disclosure of donor
identity could be applied retroactively as Tennessee and Oregon applied statutes
dealing with the issue of disclosure of adoption records retroactively. See Chestney,
suTa note 94, at 385.
See supra Part I.
179 An "informed consent agreement" is generally a type of agreement a patient
signs before undergoing a medical treatment. See generally KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN,
supra note 36, at 265. Obtaining an informed consent agreement before a medical
procedure is required by law. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 20, at 215.
180 In the gamete donation context such an agreement might also be looked at by
a court as evidence of the intent of the donor to donate gametes and not to become
a parent of the resulting child. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 36, at 313.
81 See supra Part II.A-B.
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sonably relied on the terms of the contract and reasonably believed
that their identity would remain anonymous indefinitely. 11
2
Retroactive application of the laws would be unjust and perhaps
even unconstitutional as it violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which states that "[n]o State shall... pass any... law im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts."'18 3 If a state enacts a law that in-
terferes with an existing private contract, the law will be invalidated
unless it serves a "significant and legitimate public purpose" and the
law is "reasonably related to achieving the goal."'8 a In this case, be-
cause of the severity of the impairment to the donor's contract to re-
main anonymous, a court would have to look carefully at the nature
and the purpose of the state legislation. 8 5 In doing this, it is possible
that a court would find that this issue is not one that concerns the
general public and such infringing legislation is thereby improper.
Although the Supreme Court has been hesitant to find violations of
the Contracts Clause in recent years, an argument may still be made,
especially in this context where donors clearly relied on contracts gu-
aranteeing them an anonymous status.186
This detrimental reliance issue is complicated because in some
cases the governing contract is an informed consent agreement be-
tween the physician, donor and the intended parents.'8 7 Physicians
and hospitals should not have a duty imposed on them to inform do-
nors that an informed consent agreement does not guarantee that
the donor's identity will be forever anonymous as this would be un-
182 For purposes of this section, the author writes about egg donors and not sperm
donors because as stated in Part II.B, many sperm donors do not enter into contract
regarding their identity because state laws generally proclaim the husband of the re-
cipient (of such sperm) as the legal father of the child. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN,
supra note 36, at 298. However, sperm donors might enter into agreements with the
sperm bank or agency as to their confidentiality. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 259. As such, similar reliance arguments can be
made for the sperm donor.
183 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This clause does not apply to the govern-
ment's ability to regulate the terms of future contracts. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. 213 (1827). Rather, it applies only if the government is interfering with the per-
formance of an already existing contract. Id.
18 SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 636.
185 SeeAllied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).
186 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 637-38 (noting the Court's reluctance to
find violations of the Contracts Clause, but acknowledging that Allied Structured Steel
v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), may one day be used to "revitalize the [C]ontracts
[C]lause").
187 There could also be more than one contract (one with the physician/ hospital
and the donor and one with the physician/ hospital and the intended parents).
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reasonable.'88 Physicians and hospitals should be responsible for the
medical issues related to the IVF procedure and are not qualified or
licensed to provide patients with legal advice.IS9
As demonstrated above, laws permitting or requiring disclosure
of donor identity might encourage lawsuits brought by donors and
intended parents, arguing that they relied on these contracts to their
detriment. If courts had to determine whether to enforce such
agreements, they might look to how surrogacy contracts are treated.
However, state laws currently differ greatly on the issue of whether
surrogate agreements are enforceable contracts.90 New York, the
District of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, Arizona, Utah, and North
Dakota find surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as against
public policy.' 9' However, surrogacy agreements are legal in Florida,
Virginia, New Hampshire, Illinois, and Nevada. 92 Therefore, it will
likely be unhelpful for courts to look to how surrogacy contracts are
treated if courts must determine whether or not to enforce informed
consent agreements that address donor confidentiality and courts
may be hesitant to treat any medical document such as an informed
consent agreement as anything more than this. This is problematic if
donors are not advised of this possibility.
Even if legislators took these arguments into consideration and
decided to apply the laws prospectively, there would need to be major
changes in the medical field as to what role informed consent agree-
ments would play in IVF procedures. In addition, physicians and
188 Some IVF programs do recommend that donors contact an attorney before
beginning the egg donation process. See Interview with Sharon Eyny, supra note 52.
However, it is unlikely that donors would actually contact an attorney given the fact
that most donors are young college students motivated to donate gametes for the
compensation. It is unlikely they would forego half of this payment in order to speak
to a lawyer about legal rights.
189 The counter-argument to this would be that it would not be overly burden-
some for physicians/ hospitals to have a general provision included in the informed
consent agreement that explains that this document does not guarantee that a do-
nor's identity will remain anonymous indefinitely. However, even this might become
complicated if a physician/ hospital is expected to discuss this provision with donors.
As a practical matter, most physicians/hospitals would probably not want to draw
attention to this fact because it might discourage donors from participating in the
program.
See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 36, at 306-09.
191 Id.
192 Id. In addition, such agreements are impliedly legal in Iowa, Alabama and
West Virginia. Id. In California and Massachusetts surrogacy contracts are enforcea-
ble subject to limitations. Id. In New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania dis-
putes arising in relation to surrogacy agreements are decided on a case-by-case basis.
Id. Finally, Washington, Louisiana and Kentucky deny the enforcement of surrogacy
agreements for compensation. Id.
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hospitals would need to assume more of a counseling role, which is
potentially problematic. It may even become necessary for donors to
consult attorneys in order to fully understand application of the laws
and legal consequences. It is likely that all of this would result in a
dramatic decrease in the number of people willing to be gamete do-
nors.
C. Legal and Practical Consequences: Additional Considerations as to
Why Laws Permitting or Requiring Disclosure of Donor Identity
Should Not Be Enacted
Laws allowing donor offspring to access identifying information
about their donor would likely have negative legal and practical con-
sequences as well. Because such laws could potentially impact society
as a whole, courts should consider the following legal and practical
consequences when balancing the competing interests.
First, unlike in the adoption context, where identifying informa-
tion about a child's birthparents is commonly recorded on the child's
original birth certificate, 193 identifying information about gamete do-
nors is recorded on medical records. 194 In those states that allow
adult adoptees to access identifying information, the child is provided
with the original birth certificate.' 9 5 If states were to extend this right
to donor offspring and enact a prospective law on the issue, allowing
such children to access medical records would create problems with
respect to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA),'9" which provides specific guidelines to ensure privacy
of medical records. 197 One might argue that to avoid this problem an
agency or hospital could simply provide the donor offspring with the
donor's name. However, compliance with HIPAA would still be prob-
lematic, as medical records would need to be opened at various
points in time by hospital administrators to get this identifying infor-
mation.
Second, the possible enactment of laws permitting or requiring
disclosure raises other concerns about the maintenance of donor
identifying records and tracking. Generally, identifying records on
'95 See supra Part III.A.
194 See Interview with Sharon Eyny, supra note 52.
,95 See supra Part III.A.
96 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
197 HIPAA requires health plans, most health care providers, and health care clea-
ringhouses to comply with its standards. Id. The privacy rule within HIPAA estab-
lishes regulations for the use and disclosure of protected health information, namely
any information about health status, provision of health care, payment for health
care, medical record, or payment history. Id.
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donors are maintained by sperm banks, egg/sperm donation agen-
cies, or doctors' offices if the donor donated gametes directly at the
office. 19 8 However, there is no law requiring donors to update their
records when donors marry, change their name, relocate, or acquire
new information about themselves. '' Some donors do contact the
agency or hospital where they donated gametes if they discover some
medical trait or become ill and find it necessary to document the
condition for donor offspring. °0 If laws are enacted permitting or
requiring disclosure of donor identity, states will most likely be re-
quired to take further action requiring donors to update key infor-
mation. If a donor changes his or her name or marries, medical pro-
viders will arguably need to modify donor information until the
donor offspring reaches majority. Is it reasonable to require donors
to constantly update their information or require medical providers
to store such information indefinitely?
Many other questions need to be answered before such laws can
be enacted. For example, who is responsible for the maintenance of
these records and who is going to pay for this service?2 1' Today hun-
dreds of independent agencies recruit egg and sperm donors for IVF
procedures.0 2 In those cases, the agencies maintain the identifying
203
records on the donors. If a hospital uses donors from an indepen-
198 If the donor participated in a donor program with the hospital, the identifying
information would be in the form of medical records. See Interview with Sharon Ey-
ny, supra note 52.
199 See Teri Sforza, Sometimes, It's Hush-Hush Over Donor Eggs, ORANGE COUNTy REG.,
Oct. 7, 2007, at 1, http://donorsiblingregistry.com/ocregister.pdf.
200 See id. Even when and if donors do this, there is no law requiring hospitals or
agencies to contact donor offspring/intended parents to inform them of such
changes.
201 It is likely that infertile couples would bear this cost. One might question
whether this is reasonable given how expensive it can be to maintain and store
records for indefinite periods of time. Couples undergoing IVF treatment in New
York already pay around $25,000 per single donor cycle. See Interview with Sharon
Eyny, supra note 52. Also, most insurance companies do not cover VF services, so
patients are left to pay some or all of the costs themselves. See KINDREGAN & McBR1EN,
supra note 36, at 282 n.54.
M There is also a donor sibling registry, which is a web database that allows do-
nors and/or offspring to record information in hopes of connecting with each oth-
er. See The Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ (last vi-
sited Jan. 5, 2009). If both the donor and the donor offspring provide matching in-
formation, the registry assists in making this connection possible. Id. As of Jan. 5,
2009, there were 15,294 registrants on this registry, with 9578 matches being re-
ported between donor and donor offspring and 3937 matches between donor sibl-
ings. Id.
203 See Sforza, supra note 199, at 2. Sforza discusses the recent bankruptcy of Op-
tions National Fertility Registry (Options), an agency that matches egg donors with
fertility patients in Orange County, California. Id. The agency stores documents
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dent agency, the hospital would only have records that directly relate
to the medical procedure and the agency would have all other identi-
fying information. °4 While hospitals are medically and legally obli-
gated to maintain their records for a certain number of years, it is not
clear whether independent agencies must follow the same record-
keeping requirements for donor identity information.0 5
Third, if such laws are enacted to allow donor offspring to access
identifying information about their donors, one might argue that this
creates a slippery slope for other medical areas. For example, could
organ donors have a right to access identifying information about the
family of their donor? While this argument might seem far-fetched, a
person who has undergone heart surgery and has received a heart
from someone might have a similar longing to access identifying in-
formation about the person whose heart is keeping him alive.2 0 6 In
the 1VF context, it is possible that new medical techniques will devel-
op allowing physicians to create life in new and fascinating ways,
which many people would argue is beneficial for our society. The
enactment of laws allowing donor offspring to access identifying in-
formation about donors may have the potential to hinder medical
science and prevent the development of new reproductive technolo-
gies.
As a practical matter, laws permitting or requiring disclosure of
identifying donor information would undoubtedly have a dramatic
effect on the IVF field of medicine, in particular on the supply of do-
nated gametes. 20' Egg donors and sperm donors are already in high
with egg donor names and addresses in eleven large storage cabinets. Id. Due to the
bankruptcy, there is a risk that these files will all be discarded and with that the
chances of providing many donor offspring identifying information about their do-
nor is lost. Id. at 4. The article reports that this would affect thousands of eggs and
hundreds of embryos produced by Options donors. Id. The article goes on to ques-
tion whether such records should be preserved given the fact that they contain such
highly sensitive information. Id. However, because there are no laws requiring
maintenance of such records, it is likely that the files will be thrown out. Id.
N4 See id. This is problematic because contracts might have been signed with the
donor and the agency as to the confidentiality of such records. In this case, the same
contractual problems and tracking issues discussed might arise.
205 See id. at 3.
Access to organ donor identity information is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. However, the author believes that it is unlikely that any court or legislature
would find that an organ donee has a right to access identifying information about
the organ donor.
207 As an example, the United Kingdom experienced a huge decline in the supply
of gamete donors after laws permitting disclosure of donor identity were passed. See
REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 123, at 34 n.9 (noting that "countless articles
reported that banning donor anonymity had caused a sudden, drastic drop in men
willing to donate sperm in Britain").
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demand due to the fact that so many couples are using infertility pro-
cedures to conceive children.08 Such laws could also potentially
harm other fields of medicine, such as stem cell research. Currently,
many embryos are donated to hospitals for stem cell research. 209 If
laws permitting or requiring disclosure of donor identity are enacted,
fewer donors may agree to donate gametes. This may have a spillover
effect because there will be fewer embryos produced, some of which
could have been used for stem cell research purposes.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION WITHOUT
ENACTMENT OF DISCLOSURE LAWS
This Comment does not suggest that donors should not be per-
mitted to establish relationships with donor offspring should they
have a mutual desire to do so. Rather, it posits that such relation-
ships should not be mandated. Today, many donation programs
have donor registries, which allow a donor to declare that they wish
to be contacted by their donor offspring.210 In turn, donor offspring
have the option of making contact.2" In addition, there are several
donor sibling registries where donor offspring can try and connect
with others that may be related to them without contacting the do-
nor."' Also, in all circumstances a donor offspring is allowed to know
general information about his or her heritage and medical history, if
necessary.' This shows that there are some compromises available to
aid those donor offspring who have an interest in learning about
their identity without enacting laws permitting or requiring disclo-
sure of donor identity.
M See supra Part II; see also Sforza, supra note 199, at 2 (establishing that more
than 100,000 children in our country were created from egg donation).
See Science Daily, Many Couples Choose to Donate Surplus Embryos for Stem Cell Re-
search, Apr. 27, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/04/070426145
108.htm. Stem cell research allows medical practitioners to study how undifferen-
tiated cells become differentiated. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, STEM CELL INFORMATION,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2009). Some of the most serious diseases (one being cancer) are due to ab-
normal cell division and differentiation. Id. Stem cell research has the potential to
yield important information that could lead to cures for many diseases, providing a
means for testing new drugs. Id.
210 See, e.g., Donor Offspring/Parent Registry, http://www.amfor.net/DonorOff
spring/ (last visitedJan. 5, 2009).
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., The Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/
(last visited Jan. 5, 2009).
213 See supra Part IV.
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The parties involved in each IVF procedure have unique inter-
ests that should be delicately balanced against each other in deter-
mining whether the disclosure of identifying donor information is
appropriate. Legislators should not enact all-encompassing laws
permitting or requiring disclosure of donor identity. Rather, legisla-
tors should evaluate the known competing interests and formulate a
balancing test and standards courts can apply to individual cases. In
this regard, legislators may look to adoption law and the "good cause"
214
standard as a starting point in identifying some relevant concerns.
As previously noted, because of the extraordinary nature of this issue
and the lack of a great amount of precedent in this area of the law, it
would be more appropriate for courts and legislators to address re-
quests for information on a case-by-case basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
As infertility success rates continue to increase due to the use of
new advanced medical technologies, more and more donor offspring
are being brought into the world. Such "miracle children" serve as
an example of how reproductive technology has enriched the lives of
many infertile couples, allowing them to create and raise families. In
assessing whether or not to enact laws on gamete donor disclosure,
state legislators must recognize the need for a careful balance be-
tween the competing interests of the donor, the child and the in-
tended parents. If the State finds it necessary to act, it should tho-
roughly examine each party's interests and devise alternative
solutions to achieving what is best for the child through means other
than enacting laws that generally provide donor offspring with identi-
fying donor information.
The State should continue to allow donor offspring to access in-
formation about their genetic heritage and medical information if
necessary, but should not extend this right to knowledge of identify-
ing information about donors. The State should refrain from fulfil-
ling a child's perhaps misconceived short-term wish to access identify-
ing information about his or her donor and should instead focus on
what is best for all parties, our society in general and the future of
medical science.
214 See supra Part III.A n.100.
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